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 ROMAN LAW IN MODERN LIFE AND EDUCATION'
 By JOSEPH H. DRAKE
 University of Michigan
 This discussion might be entitled, an experiment in classical
 education and how it failed. It deals with a certain small boy
 born in the middle nineties. It is in a way an Apologia pro Mea
 Vita Paedagogica. The excess of ego dixi et meus filius respondit
 in it may, therefore, perhaps be pardoned by a confession at the
 outset that it is an account of failure on the part of the speaker
 to solve a troublesome pedagogical question and a very satisfactory
 solution of the same problem by one of his colleagues in the
 Latin Department.
 Some of you may remember that the Latinists were troubled
 a number of years ago about the transition from the Beginning
 Latin Book to Caesar. In those years before we had learned so
 much about trench fighting in France, the campaigns of Caesar
 with all their wealth of military detail seemed to be very difficult
 reading for an American boy. The difficulty of translation was
 not so much in finding the English equivalent for the Latin word
 as it was in grasping the content of the Latin word itself. In the
 earlier part of the present century I was trying the experiment of
 starting a nine-year-old boy in the study of Latin. I hope the
 Lord has forgiven me for this. He certainly has punished me.
 That boy would never take any Latin after he left the high school.
 There were wheels in his head even then, and they are still there.
 He was graduated from college as an automobile engineer and is
 now chasing buzzards in Texas in a DeHaviland plane with an
 engine running 2000 R.P.M.
 In our beginning book, which was one that was used in Sexta
 in the German Gymnasium-how Teutonic we were in those days-
 occurred the word praeda, which was translated for him by the
 SDiscussion of Professor Crittenden's paper at the Michigan Classical Confer-
 ence, May 3, 1919.
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 156 THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL
 orthodox equivalent. But what did a little American boy in the
 early days of the twentieth century know about "spoil"? It
 had to be transferred to his environment. The Ann Arbor team
 had been playing football with the Ypsilanti team. It was sug-
 gested to him that if our team at the conclusion of a successful
 game had broken into the gymnasium and brought home a wagon-
 load of stuff we should have called it "spoil." The illustration
 got across. The next time the little boy ran across praeda, he
 translated it correctly "a wagon-load of stuff."
 The Latinists set to work to solve this difficulty by hunting up
 some Latin that would be easier than Caesar. There were edi-
 tions, with the hidden quantities marked, of " Viri Romae, " "The
 Lives of Nepos," "Selections from Quintus Curtius." "The Fables
 of Phaedrus," "Selections from Erasmus," and "Latin Made in
 America." Much painstaking work by more or less eminent mem-
 bers of the profession was lavished upon these editions. It was
 love's labor lost. I believe it is not too harsh to say that they
 were all failures and the movement itself was a failure, as it was
 foredoomed to be. I am informed that nearly all the schools
 have gone back to Caesar, and those men that worked along the
 line of the elaborate annotation of the text of Caesar and in this
 way translated the environment of Caesar and put an intelligible
 connotation into his words scored the success.
 But to proceed with the education of the small boy: A wander-
 ing swarm of bees alighted one morning on a neighbor's apple
 tree and he was for taking charge of them and hiving them. His
 whilom Latin instructor was able to tell him that the law defining
 his right as discoverer of the bees was carefully defined in a New
 York case (Golf v. Kilts, I5 Wend. N.Y. 530) decided in the
 earlier part of the last century, in which the court cited Blackstone
 (eighteenth century), who in turn quotes Bracton (thirteenth cen-
 tury) as authority, and Bracton goes back to Justinian."
 Not long after this fortunate combination of the real with the
 cultural elements in his classical education, the small boy became
 quite interested in the logs cast up on the beach of the island
 of "blessed leisure" where he spent his summers. He wanted
 SInst 1. f. I. 14.
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 very much to appropriate these logs to make a dock, and again
 the question of meum and tuum was solved-not in accordance
 with his desires-first by the English cases and then by Justinian.
 Though there was no traceable connection between the rules in
 the English and Roman systems, both prohibited the finder from
 appropriating to his own use marked logs whose marking gave
 evidence that they had not been abandoned by their original
 owner.
 Then he wanted to go fishing in the pot-net which was set at
 the head of the island where he could see the big fish swimming
 around, apparently eager to be caught. Might he legally do so ?
 Again an English decision of the first half of the nineteenth century
 would have answered his question in the affirmative. He might
 take the fish, if he got there before the owner of the net closed
 up the hole that gave ingress for the fish and consequently a pos-
 sibility of egress and escape. See Young v. Hichens 6 Q. B.
 606 (1844), though he would have found an earlier New York
 case, Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines (N.Y.) 175 (1805), on almost
 the same state of facts, in which there was a strong dissenting
 opinion; and he might have been told that the authorities had
 always had difficulty in deciding who had the better right on this
 state of facts-this wavering of the authorities appearing as early
 as the time of Justinian, who, after stating that his predecessors
 were uncertain about it, decides that the small boy has the better
 right.'
 Our trout brook ran down to the lake between the farms of
 Dick White and Jim Dunn. At one place the current had broken
 across a bend in the brook, making a new channel and leaving a
 bit of land between the new channel and the old, so that the land
 that had been on the south side (Jim Dunn's) was now on the
 north side (Dick White's). Did Dick White now own the bit of
 land that formerly belonged to Jim Dunn? Here was the peda-
 gogue's opportunity. In the case of Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S.
 359, the physical facts were identical with those cited above. The
 Missouri River between Omaha and Council Bluffs had cut across
 the "ox-bow" and the State of Nebraska claimed jurisdiction
 'Justinian ii. I, 13.
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 over the land that had formerly been on the Iowa side of the river.
 Iowa resisted the claim. As the parties were from different states
 they went to the United States Supreme Court for an adjudication
 of their claims. In a masterly opinion by Justice Brewer the prin-
 ciple of decision was traced back to its source. Quoting from an
 opinion of an Attorney General of the United States on a similar
 dispute between our government and Mexico, in consequence of
 changes in the channel of the Rio Bravo, the court showed that
 the principle that the jurisdiction was unchanged was an estab-
 lished element in the law of Mexico, to which it had come from
 the law of Spain. Alfonso the Wise had transferred it in 1265
 from the Italianized Roman law to his Sieta Partidas. The Ital-
 ians of the Bolognese schools had taken it from Justinian (sixth
 century); Justinian had borrowed it from Gaius (second century),
 who gave it as well-established law in his day. On the English
 side the same principle was traced back to Bracton who published
 his De legibus consuetudinibus Angliae in the same decade of
 the thirteenth century that Alfonso published his Partidas and
 drew from the same source. Bracton had used Azo, an Italian
 jurist of the thirteenth century, whose Instituciones were based
 on the Institutes of Justinian, and thus we again get back to
 Gaius and the classic Roman law. So Jim Dunn still owns the
 land in the "ox-bow" on McKay's Brook.
 But quid est quod haec fabula docet? Well! there are two
 lessons to be learned from it, one that Rollo may be thankful for,
 and both of which may be helpful to his teacher. Professor
 Crittenden has shown by his paper that in this argument between
 the Anglicists and the Romanists as to the historical relations
 between Roman law and the English common law, the Anglicists
 have the better of it. Stubbs is right, when he says that the
 coming of the Angles and the Saxons to England in the middle
 of the fifth century drew a sponge over the Roman-Keltic civili-
 zation of England. Teutonic "Kultur" was just as destructive
 of Latin culture in the fifth as it was in the twentieth century.
 Anglo-Saxon legal and political institutions for the next six cen-
 turies had an independent development along Teutonic lines.
 " See Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, chap. ii.
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 Even when the Conquest brought over to England the Norman
 law, with its large infiltrations of Roman law, it was the feudal
 elements of Norman-French law-the law of land-that became
 incorporated into the English common law, and feudalism, whether
 of the old Anglo-Saxon type or of the Norman-French type, is
 essentially Teutonic or at least post-classical and therefore non-
 Roman in essence.
 Professor Crittenden has already shown the relation of Glanvil
 in the twelfth century and of Bracton in the thirteenth to the
 sources of law. Both of them, but especially Bracton, stated the
 native English law in the form used by the classical Romans.
 Bracton's service to the English law was similar to that of Edward
 Livingston and his colleagues to the Louisiana law. They were
 directed to follow the form of expression of the Code Napoleon
 whenever that code was not at variance with the basic law of
 Louisiana, which was at that time the Spanish-Roman civil
 law. Bracton used Azo as the framework into which he put the
 principles of English common law. The hand was the hand of
 Esau, but the voice was the voice of Jacob, or rather of Johannes
 Taurus.
 For the next six centuries, because of the conflict between
 Roman pope and English king, and later between Catholicism and
 Protestantism, there was actual antipathy, sometimes manifested
 in formal enactment, against all things Roman. Even during
 this period, however, there were occasional borrowings from the
 classical system. Ejectment as a possessory action in English law
 has all the essential characteristics of the old classical interdictum
 unde vi and probably passed from the Roman law through the
 actio spolii of the canonists into the common law. English equity
 is, however, a native product, although there are many superficial
 resemblances between English chancery rulings and the principles
 of Roman aequitas, principally due to the fact that the early Eng-
 lish chancellors were usually clerics and found in the jus honor-
 arium of the praetors, equitable principles that could be readily
 applied in their courts. Since the anti-Romanist feeling has died
 down in England and in America, the borrowing from Roman
 law has been commoner. One of the most interesting instances
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 of this is found in the American courts of the earlier part of the
 last century. In the period succeeding our War of Independence,
 the anti-British feeling ran so high that it affected even our court
 decisions. Our courts, particularly those of New York and Mas-
 sachusetts, are liable to go to the Roman law--usually that of the
 French or Dutch commentators-for guidance during the first
 half of the nineteenth century, and our scholarly courts of the
 present time frequently "adopt" Roman law principles even from
 the law of the classical period. The Roman law of waters was
 translated from the Corpus Juris Civilis for the use of our western
 and southwestern courts because the Roman law, like that of the
 arid states, favors the first appropriator rather than the riparian
 owner. But after giving due credit for all these borrowings, it
 still remains true that the two systems are essentially distinct.
 The law of the western-we used to call it the civilized-world
 is not one tree with Roman and English branches. It is rather
 two distinct trunks with interlacing branches, so closely inter-
 woven sometimes that it is hard to separate them; but neverthe-
 less such statements as that of Sir William Jones, to the effect
 that the Roman law "is the source of nearly all our English law
 . . . . not of feudal origin"'I is essentially misleading, and alto-
 gether lacking in historical perspective. So much as to the relation
 of the sources.
 Now as to the pedagogical question that is of interest both
 to the small boy and to his teacher. A couple of years ago, after
 the above-described experiment in classical teaching was an
 assured failure, Professor Crittenden invited me in to hear a class
 on which he was trying another experiment. He had a class of
 twelve boys, not one of whom had had more than a couple of years
 of Latin study, though all of them were of college age. Some of
 them had taken only one semester of Latin in the University,
 which is popularly supposed to have the same value as one year
 in the high school. Whether this is true or not would seem to
 depend on whether they had had as good a teacher in college as
 these boys had. Some of them had not studied Latin for several
 years and what study they had given to it was in a poor school or
 ' Quoted with approval in Sherman's Roman Law in the Modern World.
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 under poor instruction, or both. The class was as a whole about
 equal to the average class that comes to most of you for the second
 year's work in Latin. They were using an unannotated text and
 were taking about a page a day of the Teubner text of the Insti-
 tutes of Justinian. To my astonishment they were reading it and
 not simply upsetting it. They were reading about the property in
 the swarm of bees escaping from a hive, of the right to the aban-
 doned logs, of the legality of fishing in the pot-net and as to who
 had title to the land in the "ox-bow" on McKay's Creek. The
 rights of the parties were here set out in plain and simple terms,
 in language that generations of jurists had labored over to make
 as concise and as lucid as was possible. The subject-matter was
 as comprehensible to a boy of the twentieth century as it was
 to one of the first. The environment did not need translation.
 It is needless to say that the class was interested. This experiment
 had succeeded where the others had failed. Possibly the reason
 for the success in the one case and the failure in the other was
 due to the difference in the experimenters. Cerainly in all my
 years of school visiting I have never seen better Latin teaching
 than this class was receiving, but I am sure that this experimenter
 had found a better tool than most of us had been using before.
 I have no advice to offer as to what use should be made of this
 object lesson. I am old enough to realize the futility of offering
 unsolicited advice, but I am sure that if I were having difficulty
 in making the transition from the Beginning Book to Caesar with
 a class of tenth-graders I should procure Professor Crittenden's
 edition of selections from Justinian's Institutes and try to repeat
 his success.
 It may be added that Professor Crittenden, after his several
 years' experimentation with this course, thinks that it would better
 be introduced as a partial substitute for Cicero-say for two of
 the Catilinarians-than for an equivalent amount of Caesar. The
 dead point in the high-school Latin is quite likely to come in
 the middle of the course and if this Latin, which is so sure to
 stimulate interest as being connected with the boy's environment,
 were introduced at this time it might carry him through the next
 two years and thus save him for the college course in Latin.
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 As a message from Philistia to Culturia, high-school teachers
 may say to boys who are looking forward to a career in law that
 the law schools wish students to come to them with the capacity
 to read Latin and French, and this for purely practical and disci-
 plinary reasons. The classicists may be left to take care of the
 culture argument. Scientific law of the present time must be
 studied from the historical and comparative standpoints if we
 expect law to grow along the lines of the basic principles of justice.
 But how can a comparative study of law be made unless the legal
 rules can be read in the original texts ? And this means reading,
 not a mere capacity to dig out the meaning with aid of dictionary
 or grammar. It is not enough that a law student can distinguish
 the writ of habeas corpus from the constitutional principle of
 E Pluribus Unum and possibly differentiate both from the Ne
 plus ultra cigarette. He must read Glanvil and Bracton, the
 Year Books and the Abridgments, the Code Napoleon, the Sieta
 Partidas and De Jure Belli et Pacis. He cannot get this capacity in
 two years of high-school Latin, nor in four, but with two or three
 years' college training in language study he will be prepared to
 begin the study of law in a truly scholarly way. Let us hope that
 the suggestion of this experiment by Professor Crittenden may
 help a goodly number of boys over the pons asinorum on to the
 via delectabilis eruditorum.
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